Touro Law Review
Volume 26

Number 2

Article 3

September 2012

A Passion for Justice
Charles A. Reich

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal
Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Reich, Charles A. (2012) "A Passion for Justice," Touro Law Review: Vol. 26: No. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

A Passion for Justice
Cover Page Footnote
26-2

This article is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/3

Reich: A Passion for Justice

A PASSION FOR JUSTICE
Charles A. Reich*

Justice Hugo L. Black and CharlesReich
February 27, 1966

Copyright C 2010 by Charles A Reich. A.B. Oberlin 1949, LL.B. Yale
1952. This Article
began with a letter from Professor Todd Peppers of Roanoke College, who was preparing a
book of experiences by Supreme Court law clerks. He asked me if I would contribute a
description of my year with Justice Black, and I agreed. Later it was Professor Peppers who
suggested the Post-Clerkship section. I started with what I expected to be a short piece in
the spring of 2009. Greg Marriner worked with me on every draft from the earliest effort to
the final page proof. More than anyone else Greg is the person who kept me going. Michael
Varet read a draft early in the summer of 2009 and strongly urged me to expand my
discussion of the functioning of the Warren Court. Michael continued to read draft after
draft with just the right amount of approval. Professor Rodger D. Citron is responsible for
bringing a draft to the attention of the Touro Law Review. Rodger has also contributed
many suggestions of his own. James Lucarello, editor-in-chief of the Touro Law Review,
added an imaginative touch as well as a truly professional job of editing. My longtime
friend, Ernest Rubenstein, added crucial final insights. Lee Reich deserves a special note of
appreciation for insisting that I drop my original far less descriptive title. And it was my
brother Peter who last summer recalled the Douglas-Frankfurter scene in the hallway. At
some point this Article took on a life of its own. All of those mentioned above contributed
questions, which prodded me to further efforts. My heartfelt thanks to all.
*
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A MOMENTOUS YEAR

What makes a good judge or justice? The public has a need
to know. But simplistic labels, such as "activist," "liberal" and
"conservative," are both meaningless and misleading. Perhaps a
former law clerk can offer a different perspective.
I served with David J. Vann as law clerk to Justice Hugo L.
Black during the momentous 1953 Term of the Supreme Court. This
was the year when Brown v. Board of Education' was decided. It
was also the year when Chief Justice Vinson died and was replaced
by the Governor of California, Earl Warren. And it was also a year
in which the members of the Court divided in a series of cases with
profound implications for the future, involving unlawful police
surveillance, political restrictions on the right to work, and the use of
psychiatry for "enhanced interrogation" of a suspect.
David and I lived with Justice Black in his Alexandria,
Virginia home and spent the entire day with him seven days a week,
starting.with breakfast cooked by the Judge and served at the kitchen
table, continuing with the drive to Washington and a day at the Court,
and ending with dinner and an evening of discussion in the Judge's
study upstairs. Justice Black had recently lost his wife and his
children were grown and had left home, so David and I were
"family" as well as law clerks.
I was a third-year student at Yale Law School when I applied
for a position with Justice Black. He was already an influential
figure in Supreme Court history, having been appointed in 1937 by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and having become the senior
Justice by the time that I applied. As a student I had been
tremendously impressed by Justice Black's defense of civil liberties
at a time when fear of communism had caused most judges, including
many "liberals," to uphold the persecution and punishment of
individuals who expressed dissenting views.
In the opinions I read while in law school, Justice Black made
clear that he believed prior decisions had wrongfully diminished,
diluted, and in some cases totally betrayed the Constitution's
protections of individual rights and liberties. The most conspicuous
example of such a betrayal was the Court's rewriting of the
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the "equal protection" of the
laws, a guarantee adopted after the Civil War and specifically
intended to grant equal status to former slaves. Instead of enforcing
this provision as written, the Justices had rewritten it to uphold
"separate but equal" treatment-a formula for inequality that still
remained the law in 1953.2
Similarly, in Justice Black's view, the Constitution's mandate
of "no law" abridging freedom of speech had been wrongfully
rewritten by the Justices to allow any law punishing speech that was
considered necessary to prevent perceived threats to the government.3
And in yet another example of judicial rewriting of the Constitution,
to which Justice Black strongly objected, corporations had been
given all the rights intended exclusively for natural persons. Such
were the highly independent views of the Justice with whom I had
eagerly sought a clerkship.
The year previous to my clerkship had been an unhappy one
for Justice Black. He was still grieving from the death of his wife,
Josephine, he had suffered a physically painful case of shingles, and
he was an increasingly isolated dissenter on the Vinson Court. Just
before my clerkship began, the Court had suffered the trauma of the
Rosenberg v. United States5 case, in which a hastily convened
''special session" of the Court had allowed the execution of Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg to proceed.6 Justice Black repeatedly objected
that the session itself was not authorized by the rules of the Court.'
Moreover, he contended that the Court had failed to consider
substantial issues concerning the legality of the death sentences. 8
When David and I started work, Justice Black was still angry that the
Court had failed to follow its own procedures. He refused to have
lunch with "them" and instead the three of us had lunch downstairs in
the Court's public cafeteria.
Recently Linda Greenhouse described the activities of the
current Supreme Court Justices as follows: "[I]n this media-saturated
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1896).
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
4 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
346 U.S. 273 (1953).
6 Id. at 288, 289.
Id. at 297-301 (Black, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 298-99.
2
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age, the Justices are everywhere. If they are not on book tours, they
are opining on the authorship of Shakespeare's plays, or mingling
with their peers in Europe, or on C-SPAN addressing high school
students, or at least delivering named lectures at law schools." 9
Justice Black did none of these things. David and I sat in his
office and watched him open his mail, heavy with invitations to
official functions, embassy receptions, and offers of honorary degrees
from universities. On each he wrote one word: "regret." He was
home seven nights a week and he insisted on doing all of his own
work: he wrote his own opinions, he did his own legal research, he
made his own decisions on petitions for certiorari, he read the lengthy
printed record of cases when necessary, and he made his own
preparations for hearing cases on the bench and for the Justices'
weekly conferences. Thus, David and I did none of the work usually
assigned to law clerks. For example, incredible as it may seem, we
never did any legal research. Only where the Judge's work ended did
ours begin. We read certiorari petitions and discussed his choices for
cases that the Court should review. We discussed his opinions line
by line as well as the opinions of other Justices when they were
circulated. We even listened to the angry letters he received from
people in Alabama who thought he was a Communist. In fact, we
were busy all day long, but never did we do his work.
Occasionally David and I wandered next door to the
chambers of Justice Felix Frankfurter, where Justice Frankfurter's
clerks, Frank Sander and Jim Vorenberg, offered the hospitality of
the large room with a fireplace intended for the Justice himself, while
Justice Frankfurter preferred the smaller office intended for his
clerks. Often our gossip sessions were interrupted by the sudden
appearance of the excitable Justice Frankfurter himself, who treated
everyone as one of his students, and sometimes backed me into a
corner with demands that I "explain" something to "your Judge" who
was, in Justice Frankfurter's view, a bit slow to catch on to certain
matters, such as the proper criteria for granting or denying petitions
for certiorari. Justice Frankfurter seemed to think that my Yale Law
School education might enable me to correct some of the flaws in my
Judge's education. Needless to say, I never undertook to "correct"
Justice Black.

9 Linda Greenhouse, Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at WKl.
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The area of the Court building that included the chambers of
the nine Justices, their secretaries, their messengers, and their law
clerks made up a small self-contained village where the clerks
wandered freely, carts loaded with certiorari petitions were rolled
along, and a relaxed atmosphere prevailed. Everyone was on friendly
terms, and the clerks had their own dining room where David and I
would go when our Judge finally decided it was time to have lunch
with "them." There were no female law clerks in our year; the Court
convened at noon; and government lawyers still wore formal dress.
On one memorable occasion we all dressed in rented white tie outfits
for a formal reception at the White House. We all were in the
courtroom to hear two of the greatest lawyers of the day, Thurgood
Marshall and John W. Davis, argue Brown v. Board of Education.
But thereafter, none of the law clerks except Chief Justice Warren's
worked on these cases.
I have previously written about Justice Black, but always with
a sense of constraint imposed by the confidentiality of a law clerk's
position.10 But now that more than fifty years have passed, and now
that the Court is a constant subject of political debate that is
frequently based on misconceptions, I feel that the claims of history
and the study of law have become paramount. For historians, the
story of how the new Chief Justice began as a "law and order" judge
but by the end of the 1953 Term had been transformed, with the
crucial intervention of Justice Black, into the "liberal" judge of the
"Warren Court," needs to be recorded while there is still a witness
able to do so. For aspiring legal academics, a close-up of one
Justice's thought processes and tactics should prove valuable. For
law students I would like to provide a picture of one individual who
truly loved the law. For all of the above and for the public as well,
there is the ultimate test of what makes a good judge: a passion for
justice.

10 See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 673 (1963) [hereinafter The Living Constitution]; see also CHARLES A. REICH, THE
SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 22-24 (Bantam Books 1977); Charles A. Reich, Deciding the
Fate of Brown, The Populist Voices of Earl Warren and Hugo Black, 7 Green Bag 137
(2004) [hereinafter Deciding the Fate ofBrown].
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IN THE JUDGE'S STUDY

Backyard view of 619 South Lee Street in October of 1956. (Center)
clerk apartment & grape arbor. (Left) The bench where JusticeBlack
discussed Brown v. Board of Education. (Right) The main house.
Photographtaken by Charles Reich

David and I occupied our own quarters on the ground floor of
Justice Black's beautiful old home at 619 South Lee Street in
Alexandria, Virginia. Our windows looked out on a grape arbor and
tennis court. Our day began when the Judge, in his bathrobe,
knocked on our door to tell us that breakfast, which he prepared, was
almost ready. At breakfast, in the kitchen, he liked to read aloud
from the Washington Post, with many humorous asides. He
especially enjoyed the Herblock cartoons. We each had a car, and we
rotated cars and drivers for the daily trip to Washington and to the
Court. Together we arrived at the Court at 10:00 a.m. Usually we
had lunch together in the Court's public cafeteria. Between 12:00
p.m. and 12:10 p.m. the line was open to Court employees only, and
the Judge liked to time our trip downstairs so that we just made the
tail end of the employees' line. At precisely 3:50 p.m., just ahead of
the afternoon rush hour, we departed for Alexandria. Dinner was
served at about 6:00 p.m. by Lizzie Mae Campbell, the Judge's
longtime cook and housekeeper. Then the three of us would climb
the stairs to the Judge's second floor study for a session that would
last until bedtime. For me, this was the most remarkable and
inspiring part of our day together.
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The study was filled with books, including a full set of U.S.
Reports containing all previous Supreme Court decisions and
opinions.
There was space on the walls for many framed
photographs, usually autographed, of individuals the Judge had
known in his long public career as a senator and Justice. My
favorite, in a place of honor, was a photograph of Senator George
Norris of Nebraska, inscribed "To my friend Justice Black with
admiration and love." The books revealed a great deal about the
Judge's concept of what it meant to be a Supreme Court Justice. To
him, it was a position that went far beyond merely voting on cases.
To begin with, the job required a scholar, one who had studied
history all the way back to the Greeks and the Romans, with
particular emphasis on the history of liberty and tyranny, and the rise
of the rule of law. The Framers of the Constitution were well
represented, as was the history of English law going back to the
Magna Carta.
The spirit that pervaded this remarkable room was best
expressed in Edith Hamilton's The Greek Way," a book beloved by
Justice Black and frequently referred to in our conversations. The
Greeks, writes Hamilton, were the first to practice "the supremacy of
mind in the affairs of men .

. . ,

the first intellectualists. In a world

where the irrational had played the chief role, they came forward as
protagonists of the mind.

. .

. The Greeks said, 'All things are to be

examined and called into question. There are no limits set to
thought.' "12
In this spirit, there were no limits set to what David or I could
say or ask as the Judge sat behind his desk, rocking gently back and
forth, and David and I occupied two easy chairs facing him. Most
frequently the subject was a case we were working on, with the
printed record on the desk, and perhaps the first draft of an opinion or
dissent in our hands.
But before we reached the subject of any specific case, the
Judge gave us some insight into how he viewed the job of being a
Supreme Court Justice and how he prepared for that job. A Justice
must have a judicial philosophy. He saw his role as a defender of the
Constitution, and as a protector of the individual, to whom the
Constitution belonged. Essential to this role was knowledge of
11EDITH HAMILTON, THE GREEK WAY
12

(W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1993) (1930).
Id. at 16, 25 (citing generally to Greek philosophic sayings).
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history, in particular the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution,
and the fears of power that concerned them. This led back to English
history, to the injustices that the Framers knew about and sought to
prevent, and further back to the long struggle between tyranny and
the rule of law.' 3 Much as he loved his country, Justice Black
believed that the rise of tyranny was always a possibility, that
exaggerated fears, such as the fear of Communism, pose an everpresent threat to liberty, and that freedom remains, in the words of
Stephen Vincent Benet, "a hard bought thing." 1 4
Crucial to the Judge's judicial philosophy was his invariable
practice of looking directly at the words of the Constitution itself,
rather than at previous Supreme Court interpretations of those words.
Most judges are inclined to follow precedents; he was never satisfied
with precedents if he thought the words of the Constitution did not
support them.
Justice Black opposed any interpretation of the Constitution
that allowed broad leeway to judges. He repeatedly objected to any
view of the First Amendment that allowed judges to engage in
"balancing" the interests of government against the interests of the
individual.' 5 To him, "balancing" was judge-made law, never
intended by the Framers. Likewise, he rejected vague and shifting
interpretations of the phrase "due process of law," seeking to give the
phrase a definite meaning limiting the discretion of judges. 16
For the same reason, the Judge was also determined to restore
to their full vigor sections of the Constitution that had been allowed
to fall into disuse, notably the prohibition against bills of attainder
and the prohibition against ex post facto laws.17 He was keen to find
1 See Deciding the Fate ofBrown, supra note 10, at 139.
14 See id.; see also STEPHEN VINCENT BENtT, Freedom's a Hard-Bought Thing, in
SELECTED WORKS OF STEPHEN VINCENT BENtT VOLUME 2: PROSE 46 (Farrar & Rinehart

1942).
15 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 60-62 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
16 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381-82 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
17 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 444 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting)
(referring to bill of attainder); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 522 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) (referring to both bill of attainder and ex post facto laws); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 260-62 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (referring to ex post facto laws);
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 460 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) (referring to
bill of attainder).
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present-day examples of both these abuses, while other Justices
treated them as archaic remnants of a bygone era.
Finally, Justice Black was acutely sensitive to the injury done
to any individual and the harm done to society in any given case.
While other Justices stated the facts of a case in abstract and
legalistic terms, in opinions and particularly in dissents he made sure
to present the facts as a vivid narrative. 18
During our sessions there were no interruptions. When David
and the Judge were having an exchange, I liked to sit back and watch
the Judge's expressive face register his feelings. When we discussed
a case where power had been abused and an individual had suffered
harm, the Judge's face showed pain and anger. Too often in law
school my teachers, many of them "legal realists," made law seem
like a game or even a joke, and any answer was just as acceptable as
the opposite answer. This often made for good, lively classroom
teaching, but ultimately it left students cynical and disillusioned
about the law as a profession. Later, when I became a teacher, I
often wished that my students could have shared my experience in
the Judge's study. It profoundly renewed my idealism and belief that
justice is the foundation of society. Yet I have never heard a senator
ask a Supreme Court nominee, "Do you have a passion for justice?"
III.

IRVINE V. CALIFORNIA

"I thought a man was going to get hit back there in the
Conference Room!" It was Saturday afternoon and we were driving
back to Alexandria after the Justices' weekly private conference. Of
course David and I were eager to hear the Judge's story. The case
under discussion was Irvine v. California,19 which eventually
produced five opinions, and no "opinion of the Court." Justice
Frankfurter had written an elaborate dissent,2 0 to which Justice Clark,
concurring with the majority, offered a tart rebuttal in a separate
opinion of his own.2 1 When it was his turn to speak, Justice
Frankfurter had taken a copy of Clark's opinion and torn it to bits in
front of the other Justices, throwing the pieces on the Conference
1 See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 556-62 (1954).
1 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
20 Id. at 142-49 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
21 Id. at 138-39 (Clark, J., concurring).
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Room's carpeted floor. Justice Clark, a tall Texan who wore a
cowboy hat, did not take kindly to being humiliated in front of his
colleagues. Apparently, the new Chief had intervened to prevent
violence. Justice Black was amused. Obviously he had seen "Felix"
in action many times before.
Irvine was a case involving an extraordinary intrusion by
police into an individual's home. The police suspected petitioner,
Irvine, of illegal bookmaking.2 2 While Irvine and his wife were
absent from their home, and without any warrant, an officer arranged
with a locksmith to make a door key, and a concealed microphone
was installed in the hall.2 3 A hole was bored in the roof of the house
and wires were strung to a nearby garage where officers could listen
to any conversations picked up by the microphone.2 4 After a week of
listening, officers again made illegal entry into the house and moved
the microphone into the bedroom. 25 After listening to bedroom
conversations for twenty more days, officers again made illegal entry
and moved the microphone to a closet, continuing their round-theclock eavesdropping until it had lasted more than a month.26
Eventually they heard incriminating statements that were used to
convict Irvine of gambling.27
This was a classic case of a wrong without an adequate
remedy. The normal remedy for illegally obtained evidence is to
exclude the evidence from a defendant's trial.2 8 But because of an
earlier decision by the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Frankfurter, the exclusionary rule applied only to trials in
federal courts and not to a trial in the state courts.2 9
The Justices could agree on only one thing: they all
denounced the illegal conduct by the police. Justice Jackson wrote,
"[t]hat officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such
Id. at 129 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 130-31.
24 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 131.
22
23

25
26
27

Id.
id.
id.

Id. at 135-36.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (Frankfurter), overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Clark). Justice Clark had the satisfaction of writing the opinion in
Mapp overruling Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf which had restricted the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to the states. The overruling of Wolf was a great victory for Justice
Black's philosophy of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
28

29
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a device, even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the
occupants for over a month would be almost incredible if it were not
admitted." 30 Justice Frankfurter said that the criminal actions by the
officers lead "down the road to totalitarianism." 3 1 Justice Douglas
wrote, "The search and seizure conducted in this case smack of the
police state, not the free America the Bill of Rights envisaged." 32 But
the members of the Court could not agree on any remedy. Five voted
to affirm the conviction. Among them was Chief Justice Warren,
who had once served as Attorney General of California. He joined
an opinion by Justice Jackson, with Justices Reed and Minton
concurring. After saying that the conviction of Irvine must be
upheld, Jackson added the following totally unprecedented statement:
It appears to the writer, in which view he is supported
by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, that there is no lack of
remedy if an unconstitutional wrong has been done
....
[The conduct of the police] may constitute a
federal crime . . . . We believe the Clerk of this Court

should be directed to forward a copy of the record in
this case, together with a copy of this opinion, for
attention of the Attorney General of the United States.
However, Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice
MINTON do not join in this paragraph. Judgment
Affirmed.3 3
The proposal by Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Warren,
which sought to initiate a criminal investigation of the police officers
by the Department of Justice, produced a surprisingly angry response
by Justice Black. He wrote: "I would strongly object to any such
action by this Court. It is inconsistent with my own view of the
judicial function in our government. Prosecution, or anything
approaching it, should, I think, be left to government officers whose
duty that is." 3 4
Irvine presented the Judge with a dilemma, and led to much
discussion in the study. He did not want to affirm a conviction based
30 Irvine, 347 U.S. at

132.

" Id. at 149 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
32 Id (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33
34

Id. 137-38 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).
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on illegal police conduct. He did not want to base a dissent on the
"vague" due process grounds utilized by Justice Frankfurter with
Justice Burton concurring,35 nor could he agree with a vigorous
dissent by Justice Douglas arguing for the exclusion of the
evidence.36 Instead, he amazed David and me by finding in the
record of the case an entirely different ground for dissent, which
allowed him to discuss another provision of the Constitution that he
considered under-utilized-the self-incrimination clause.
Federal law imposed a special tax on wagering, which Irvine
had duly paid, receiving in return a "federal wagering tax stamp,"
which was found in his possession and introduced in evidence in his
state trial for gambling, along with the surveillance evidence obtained
by state police officers. 37 Alone among the Justices, Justice Black
called this "evidence" a violation of the Fifth Amendment provision
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.38
He wrote: "I cannot agree that the Amendment's guarantee against
self-incrimination testimony can be spirited away by the ingenious
contrivance of using federally extorted confessions to convict of state
crimes . .. .,.39 And the Judge added his view that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment, an idea that would

eventually succeed in influencing the Warren Court. 40 And finally he
made it clear that the Court's decision in Irvine was one more
example of how judges have wrongly narrowed the protections of the
Bill of Rights.4 1 In his words, the Court's interpretation "frustrates a
basic purpose of the Fifth Amendment-to free Americans from fear
that federal power could be used to compel them to confess conduct
or beliefs in order to take away their life, liberty or property." 4 2
Here was the Judge eloquently going beyond anything taught
in the law schools or written in the law reviews. Here was the Judge
" Irvine, 347 U.S. at 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
38 Id. at 139-41 (Black, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 140.
40 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 141-42. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that such warnings are a prophylactic device,
required by the Fifth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the
right against self-incrimination).
41 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 142 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
42 Id.
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saying that the true intentions of the Framers had been undone by
"interpretation" that diminished the liberties of all Americans, just as
"equal" had been turned into its opposite-"separate but equal."
Irvine had an unsatisfactory outcome, not only because of the
Justices' disagreements, but also because of the underlying reality
that the words of an eighteenth century constitution proved
inadequate to the twentieth century realities of surveillance. But
neither Justice Black, nor any other member of the Court appeared
ready to address this dilemma directly.

IV.

EXERCISING THE MIND

The Judge was a great believer in exercise-both physical
and mental. If he could not find a tennis partner, he would go to the
tennis court with a large basket of balls that he would hit from one
side to the other, pick them all up, and repeat the process by hitting
them all back. He was unlucky to find that neither David nor I
played tennis, but we at least partly made up for that deficiency by
enthusiastically participating in mental exercise. David was the first
to recognize that the Judge enjoyed a good argument. Apparently
David had taken a course in Admiralty Law at the University of
Alabama, because he came out swinging as the Judge prepared a
lengthy dissent in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing,43 a case where
a towboat named Jane Smith hit a railroad bridge and sank in the
Atchafalaya River, causing five crew members to lose their lives.
For many evenings the Judge's study was filled with arguments
concerning maritime law. I had never taken a course in this subject;
in fact, I did not even know where to find the Atchafalaya River on a
map, but I saw that the Judge would allow a law clerk to make a fullblown argument just like a lawyer in court, and when the time came I
too made a full-blown argument in a later case that interested me
deeply. David showed me how far the Judge would go in granting
equality to his law clerks so they could challenge the Judge with full
vigor. Of course the Judge made clear that he would not readily
change his own long-held views. But he was a great believer in
hearing the other side, and he clearly considered that kind of
openness to be an essential part of being a judge.
43

347 U.S. 409 (1954).

4

Id. at 427 (Black, J., dissenting).
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During our serious sessions in the study, David was
thoughtful, congenial, and more than able to hold his own when the
discussion grew serious. It was David, not me, who asked the Judge
about his early membership in the Klan, whether the Klan as he knew
it was actively racist, and why the Judge had quit the Klan when he
did. I would never have dared to ask these questions. David also
asked about some of the Judge's more questionable early decisions
such as the first flag salute case 45 and the Japanese internment case, 46
both of which might be seen in hindsight as mistakes.
Many people have asked me what the Judge had to say about
the Klan. He told us that it was just a social and fraternal
organization, like many others he belonged to. David and I found
this answer frustrating, but the Judge would go no further, and we
were left to wonder.
After an evening in the study, when the Judge had retired for
the night, David and I sometimes talked about the events of the day,
the interplay among the Justices, and the Judge's own stubborn
streaks. David had both tact and humor, but he was fully prepared to
argue his views strenuously when he thought the Judge was wrong.
Spending seven days and nights together week after week could have
been a disaster instead of an extraordinary experience. David's
personal gifts made a huge difference.
In my first interview with Justice Black he told me that he
habitually chose most of his law clerks from the South. He hoped
they would return home to fight for the ideals he believed in. David
was a native of Alabama and a graduate of the University of Alabama
School of Law. He would go on to become a leader in the
Birmingham desegregation struggle and the mayor of that city as
well. In David's case the Judge's hopes were fully realized.
Of course every one of Justice Black's law clerks must have
played the role of mental exercise partner, and some were tennis
partners as well. I never got to observe them in action. But during
the 1953 Term the Judge had occasional guests, and it was interesting
to see that they too provided the Judge with mental exercise, although
Court business was never discussed. Each guest was invited to come
45
46

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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got the tenderloin part of the steak, and upstairs
quieter than usual, although we were always
Otherwise, the routine in the study was much the
was for three.

407

of three, the guest
David and I were
welcome to talk.
same for four as it

Justice Black at the dinner table next to his chair
February27, 1966

Among the guests, I remember Senator Lister Hill of Alabama,
Benjamin V. Cohen, Justice Douglas, Professor Edmund Cahn of
New York University Law School, Tom Corcoran, who brought his
accordion and sang for us, and Chief Justice Warren.
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Justice Douglas after an overnight trip on the C&O Towpath in
May 1956-one of the few photos of the Justice smiling.
Photograph taken by CharlesReich

I found Justice Douglas fascinating from the moment he
walked in the door, with his ruddy outdoorsman face, battered
western hat, and intense energy. Justice Black had more than once
said to David and me, "Bill is a genius." Now I could see and hear
for myself. Justice Douglas was encyclopedic in his knowledge. He
had traveled all over the world, and would gather facts about a
country, its government, and its people that few other travelers would
learn. He was one of the earliest environmentalists, not only
knowledgeable about plants, fish, and animals, but concerned about
climate, pollution and land use before most people had heard
anything at all about these subjects. There was none of Justice
Black's benevolence, however. One day at the Court, my brother
Peter was visiting, and we noticed a small crowd of law clerks
surrounding Justice Frankfurter in the hallway. At that moment,
Justice Douglas happened to walk by, and we heard him call out,
"Spinning your web, Felix?"
Justice Douglas told us his personal story of the Rosenberg
case events that preceded the Court's decision. He had been ready to
leave for the summer, after the Court ended its Term in June, when
he was approached by lawyers with a last-minute plea in the
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Rosenberg case. He reluctantly agreed to listen. Even more
reluctantly, he concluded that their argument-that the Rosenbergs
had been convicted and sentenced under the wrong statute-required
a full hearing.4 7 Accordingly he issued a stay of execution until the
Court's fall session,48 jumped into his car, and started the long drive
to his summer cabin at Goose Prairie, Washington. When he stopped
for the night at a motel on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, he turned on
the television news and was stunned to learn that Chief Justice
Vinson had called a special session of the Court to overturn the
stay.49 The next morning he headed back to the hearing, which both
he and Justice Black believed was improperly called.

Charles Reich next to his blue Dodge

When Chief Justice Warren came for dinner, I was dispatched
in my used blue Dodge to call for him at his temporary residence in
the Wardman Park Hotel in northwest D.C. This forty-five-minute
drive with the famous ex-governor of California, ex-presidential
candidate, and new Chief Justice, plus the return trip, was just about
as exciting as things can get for a twenty-five-year-old newly out of
law school, and today at the age of eighty-two I can still feel the
thrill.
Rosenberg v. United States, 73 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1953), vacated, 346 U.S. 273.
48 id.
49 Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 288-89.
47
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With each guest the Judge was his usual self, rocking back
and forth behind his desk, perhaps taking a volume of Tacitus down
from the shelves, asking questions and making sure that there was
serious talk. I marveled at the calming effect that the Judge had on
Justice Douglas, who could be restless, brusque and impatient, but
when asked about his travels became eloquent and even flashed his
winning smile at David and me. The Chief and the Judge found
common ground in running for office and winning elections, and
with Senator Hill the talk was about politics in Alabama. Otherwise,
these evenings resembled our regular sessions to a remarkable
degree.

V.

BARSKY V.BOARD OF REGENTS AND THE RIGHT TO WORK

After I graduated from law school, I took what was called a
cram course in preparation for the much-feared New York State bar
examination. A crowd of applicants filled a sweaty classroom in
downtown New York for several weeks as our instructor shouted
information I had never learned at Yale, such as the three ways to
serve a complaint at the start of a lawsuit. I did manage to pass the
exam, only to learn that there was another hurdle: a grilling by the
Committee on Character and Fitness. And, I was warned, the
Committee would reject applicants if they revealed the slightest trace
of left-wing sympathies or "communistic" associations. In those
days of anti-left hysteria the danger of rejection on political grounds
was very real. One of my professors at Yale Law School, Clyde
Summers, was refused admission to the bar in Illinois solely because
of his pacifist beliefs, and the denial of his right to practice his
profession had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.o
Worse, two outstanding young professors at Yale Law School, Vern
Countryman, who had been a law clerk for Justice Douglas, and
David Haber, who had clerked for Justice Black, were denied tenure
and dismissed from the faculty at Yale for their supposed left-wing
views.' I had taken classes with both Countryman and Haber, who I
found to be brilliant thinkers. Such were the 1950s in America.
so In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 573 (1945).
51 LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS,

236,237 (University of North Carolina Press 2005); John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand
Dollar Question Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, 41 STAN. L. REv. 435, 440-41 (1989).
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I had nothing of a political nature on my record and managed
to pass the scrutiny of the character committee and get admitted to
the New York bar. (Fortunately they were not mind readers.) But
when a case came before the Supreme Court in the 1953 Term in
which a physician had been suspended from practicing medicine in
New York State for what were blatantly political reasons, opposition
to the Franco dictatorship in Spain,5 2 his case took on a highly
personal meaning for me.
Barsky v. Board of Regents had a distressing outcome. The
Court upheld Dr. Barsky's suspension by a vote of six to three; we
lost the vote of the new Chief Justice; and the dissenters, Justice
Black, Justice Frankfurter and Justice Douglas, split three ways. The
old dispute over due process divided the dissenters.
But I got an
opportunity to argue my views before a Supreme Court Justice-with
vastly more time than would have been allowed any lawyer arguing
before the Court. And eventually I put my views into a law journal
article. 54 So, I remain grateful for the Barsky case and for the Judge's
generosity in hearing me out-even if he accepted none of my
arguments!
Dr. Edward A. Barsky was a physician who practiced
medicine in New York since 1919.s5 In 1946 he was summoned
before the House Un-American Activities Committee.5 6 He was at
that time the chairman of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee,
an organization founded in 1942 to help with the problem of Spanish
refugees from the Franco dictatorship.s? Barsky appeared before the
Committee but refused to produce records and papers demanded by
the Committee.5 8 For this offense against Congress he was sentenced
to serve six months in jail. 59 His conviction was upheld and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, with Justices Black and Douglas

Barsky, 347 U.S. at 456-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
s Compare id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (utilizing the Due Process Clause),
with id. at 456-67 (Black, J., dissenting).
54 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter The
New Property].
s Barsky, 347 U.S. at 445.
52

56

Id. at 444.

5 Id. at 457 (Black, J., dissenting).
s8 Id. at 444-45 (majority opinion).
s9 Id. at 445.
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noting their dissents.60 Thereafter, charges were filed against him by
the New York State Medical Committee on Grievances. 6 ' Ten
doctors constituting the Committee found Barsky guilty of charges
under the state law governing medical practice, and voted to suspend
him from practice for six months.62 The suspension was upheld by
the New York State Court of Appeals, that court declaring itself
"wholly without jurisdiction" to consider whether the Committee and
the Board of Regents based the suspension on "matters not proper for
consideration."6 3 Under procedures then in effect, Barsky was
entitled to a mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Court,
however reluctant, was compelled to hear the case.6 4
As we sat in the study, it was clear that Justice Black was
deeply outraged by the suspension of Barsky on grounds that had
nothing to do with Barsky's competence to practice medicine. And
the Judge, as a former senator, had no patience with a congressional
But what
committee investigating "un-American activities."
constitutional grounds were available to overturn the suspension? A
denial of due process seemed the only possible ground and, as in
Irvine, Justice Black was most unwilling to employ this concept. But
he did allow me to argue strenuously for its use in this case.
I said that more and more professions and occupations were
subject to licensing by the state, not merely physicians and lawyers,
but taxi drivers, school teachers, even amateur fishermen in the
Adirondacks. If the ability to work and earn a living was no longer
part of the liberty of every citizen, then the only people who were
genuinely free would be the very young, the retired, and those so
wealthy that they did not need to earn a living. Could all of the
freedoms of Americans be taken away by the simple device of
controlling their right to work? Moreover, John Locke, in his
writings on property, describes the individual's liberty to work and
earn a living as the most basic form of "property." 65 Due process is
60

Barsky, 347 U.S. at 445 (citing Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948),

cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948)).
61 Id. at 445-46.
62

Id. at 446.

63 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 111 N.E.2d 222, 226 (N.Y. 1953).

6 Barsky, 347 U.S. at 448 (noting that the court found probable jurisdiction) (citation
omitted).
65 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett

Publishing Company 1980) (1690).
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said to protect "life," "liberty," and "property." Surely, I argued, the
Framers intended to protect the ability to work from arbitrary
deprivation by government.
Justice Black was still not prepared to use due process in the
manner I suggested. For a moment David and I caught a glimpse of a
side of his character that usually remained well hidden: the longrange strategist, who was determined to bring about a revolution in
the Court's entire interpretation of due process, expanding it to
include the Bill of Rights. He proved willing to pursue this goal
patiently through many years, until the Court finally accepted most of
it. He had begun his campaign in 1946, and would continue his
efforts for many years after the 1953 Term, until a much later
Court-by then the "Warren Court"-accepted almost all of his
"incorporation theory," an accomplishment by a single Justice
possibly unique in the Court's history.66
But for the present, for the Barsky case, the Judge found two
other powerful grounds for his dissent, both of which derived from
his habit of studying the record of a case himself, and both of which
made pioneering contributions to constitutional law. He discovered
that, as part of the license suspension proceedings, evidence had been
introduced that Barsky's Refugee Committee had been listed by the
Attorney General of the United States as a "subversive"
67
organization.
This published list, Justice Black boldly declared,
was the modern equivalent of the ancient "bill of attainder"
specifically prohibited by the Constitution."
For those who are interested in debates concerning the
"originalist" approach to interpreting the Constitution, there could be
no more striking example of Justice Black's "originalist" approach
than his opinion in Barsky. Historically, a bill of attainder was a
legislative condemnation of an individual without a judicial trial.69
To call the Attorney General's list a bill of attainder might be
considered either a far-fetched stretching of a historic term or the
modern equivalent of an evil that the Framers intended to prohibit.
Both of these approaches lay claim to the label "originalist."
The medical grievance committee had allowed Dr. Barsky to
66 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 664-65 (Black, J., concurring).
67 Barsky, 347 U.S. at 460 (Black, J., dissenting).
68 Id.

69 The Living Constitution,supra note 10, at 710-11.
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be questioned about whether his organization was "subversive," "unAmerican," and "communistic."7 o In the Judge's view, these
questions were wholly improper in a proceeding to suspend a medical
license, suggesting that Barsky had been guilty of the "crime" of "unAmerican activities" without any conviction or proof.7
Moreover, the Judge found that the ultimate licensing
authority in New York State, the Board of Regents, possessed
unlimited discretion to suspend any physician's license without
giving any reason:
[S]o far as we know the suspension may rest on the
Board's unproven suspicions that Dr. Barsky had
associated with Communists. This latter ground, if the
basis of the Regents' action, would indicate that in
New York a doctor's right to practice rests on no more
than the will of the Regents.7 2
Finally, the Judge quoted from a much older Supreme Court opinion:
"For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment
of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails . . . ."73 And to his dissent the Judge
added, in his statement of the case, seven words in which I could take
pride. Referring to the right of a physician to practice his or her
profession and, by implication, the right to work itself, he wrote: "It
may mean more than any property." 74
I remember that Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent in
Barsky, and I was sent down the hall to get his newly printed opinion
and give him a copy of the Judge's dissent. He was very cordial, and
although the two dissents were based upon very different theories of
the law, the Judge and Justice Douglas signed each others' opinions
in a doctrinally inconsistent but friendly gesture.
When I was re-reading Barsky in 2010, with unemployment
in the news every day, I came across this remarkable paragraph from
Barsky, 347 U.S. at 464-65, 467 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 459, 464-65.
72 Id. at 463.
73 Id. at 463-64 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
74 Id. at 459.
70

7n
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Surely his prophetic words

The right to work, I had assumed, was the most
precious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed
as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to
own property. The American ideal was stated by
Emerson in his essay on Politics, 'A man has a right to
be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered.'
It does many men little good to stay alive and free and
propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to
eat. It also means to live. For many it would be better
to work in jail, than to sit idle on the curb. The great
values of freedom are in the opportunities afforded
man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength
against the forces of nature, to match skills with his
fellow man.

VI.

COURTING THE CHIEF

In case after case during the 1953 Term, the Judge found
himself on the opposite side from the new Chief Justice. On this
painful subject, the Judge said nothing at all. Meanwhile, Justice
Frankfurter was making an obvious and very public attempt to
instruct his newest "student" in the duties of a Supreme Court Justice.
The odd couple was frequently seen in the hall, with Justice
Frankfurter holding the Chief's arm with one hand while
gesticulating with the other hand in a professorial manner. David and
I often saw the Chief as he came through our door on his way to
discuss some matter with Justice Black. The Chief was hearty and
outgoing. But David and I each suspected that Justice Frankfurter's
teacher-student relationship would not last. We often talked about
this late at night after our session with the Judge in the study, and
especially after the evening when the Chief came out to dinner. The
Chief was a proud man. But, we both suspected, he might be thinskinned. The Judge certainly did not treat him like a student. The
Judge called him "Chief' and made no attempt to "teach" him
anything.
"s Barsky, 347 U.S. at 472 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Other Justices also made a play for the Chief. Justice Jackson
evidently had the Chief's ear in Irvine v. California, but Justice
Jackson was soon taken ill and vanished from the scene. Justice
Douglas invited the Chief to go walking on the C&O Canal towpath,
but this effort proved disastrous. We all heard that the Chief had
returned with sore feet and blisters, and that Mrs. Warren had said
never again.
The Judge finally found a case with which he could win over
the Chief. I have already mentioned that the Judge read and decided
petitions for certiorari himself, contrary to the practice of most
Justices. One day the Judge picked a case that no law clerk would
have ever chosen. In an earlier form, it had already been denied
review by the Supreme Court.7 6 The case seemed to meet none of the
criteria of "public importance" required for review by the Court. It
was a sordid murder case, in which a middle-aged man had beaten
his elderly parents to death with a hammer, a crime to which he had
confessed and for which he had been sentenced to death in New
York."
But the Judge had studied the record in the case, and he was
deeply troubled by the confessions introduced into evidence, because
they had been obtained by the use of a police-employed psychiatrist
pretending to "help" the defendant.7 8 The Judge called us into his
office, where he was seated with the printed record on his desk. He
said that he had discovered that a tape recording had been made of
the psychiatrist talking to the defendant. "Don't you think we ought
to hear that recording for ourselves?" he asked. David and I nodded.
"Why don't we ask the Clerk's office to send for it?" We nodded
again. And in due time a tape recording arrived from New York, the
Clerk's office supplied a machine to play it, and the three of us sat
down to listen.
76 People v. Leyra (Leyra 1I), 108 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
918
(1953).
n Leyra, 347 U.S. at 556-57. In Leyra's first trial the New York Court of Appeals held
that the primary confessions used by the prosecution were extorted by coercion. People v.
Leyra (Leyra 1), 98 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1951). After a jury determination that subsequent
confessions made by Layra were voluntary, Leyra was again convicted and the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed. Leyra II, 108 N.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918. After an
unsuccessful habeas corpus petition, Layra again sought review by the Supreme Court,
which was granted. Leyra v. Denno 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S.
926 (1954).
7 Leyra, 347 U.S. at 559-60.
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Prior to what we heard on the tape recording, the defendant,
Camilio Leyra, Jr., had already undergone lengthy questioning by the
police, but had admitted nothing. On the day that his parents' bodies
were found, a Tuesday, Leyra was questioned by the police until
11:00 p.m. 7 9 On Wednesday he was questioned from 10:00 a.m. to
midnight. On Thursday he was questioned from 9:00 a.m. through
the day and the night until 8:30 a.m. the following morning, when he
was taken to his parents' funeral.81 After the funeral he was allowed
to sleep for an hour and a half after which questioning resumed. 82
During his absence a concealed microphone had been installed,
enabling the police to listen to and record any further conversation.83
At no time was a lawyer present and Leyra made no admissions. 84
Leyra had been suffering from acute sinus pains, and after the
concealed microphone had been installed the police promised to get a
physician to help him.
He was introduced to Dr. Helfand,
supposedly a doctor who would help with the sinus pain." In fact,
Dr. Helfand was a psychiatrist who had considerable experience with
hypnosis. The dialogue went in part as follows:
'Q.-(continued)- [I am] going to make you remember
and recollect back and bring back thoughts-thoughts
which you think you might have forgotten.... It's
entirely to your benefit to recollect them because, you
see, you're a nervous boy. You got irritable and you
might have got in a fit of temper. Tell me, I am here
to help you. A. I wish you could, Doctor.'
'Q. I am going to put my hand on your forehead, and
as I put my hand on your forehead, you are going to
bring back all these thoughts that are coming to your
mind ....

7 Id. at 558.
80 Id.

" Id. at 558-59.
82 Id. at 559.
8
84

Leyra, 347 U.S. at 559.
Id

"86 Id
id.

87 id.
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'Q. . . . What did you do when you sat down. Come
on, speak up. Don't be afraid now. We're with you.
We're going to help you. You're going to feel lots
better after you talk to me. A. Gee, I hope so.'
'Q. ... Look at me. Open your eyes. Now you know
what happened. Look at me. I know you know what
happened. A. I can't think.'
'Q. Sure you can. Come on now. Don't be afraid.
Your conscience will be clear. God will be with you,
and everybody will help you if you tell the truth.
Everybody will help you, but nobody likes a liar, not
even God. Come on now. Tell the truth. A. I can't
think.'
'Q. Your father went for the paper; then you hit your
Mother, didn't you? With what did you hit-with a
hammer? Your thoughts are coming back to you.
What did you use to hit your mother with? A. I loved
my mother.
'Q. I know you did. You lost your temper. Don't be
afraid. A lot of people do things that they are not
responsible for while in a fit of temper. You see?
'Q. So what did you do. Speak up. I'll positively
help you if I can. I'm with you one hundred per cent.
I'm going to help you. You're going to feel fine.
Your conscience will be clear and everything will be
fine. Don't hide anything. You did it in a fit of
temper. Your mother went to the sink to give you
some water. So you did what? You went up to her?
A. I was standing there waiting for him to come back.
I picked up the hammer.'
'Q. You got a much better chance to play ball ...
than if you say you don't remember.' 8 8
Leyra, 347 U.S. at 565, 567, 569-70, 575, 583.
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As the session continued and Dr. Helfand repeated his
suggestions over and over again, Leyra's voice sounded so slow and
dazed that he seemed drugged, hypnotized, or just plain exhausted,
like a person barely awake, barely able to answer. 89 The doctor kept
saying, "I have my hand on your forehead and your thoughts are
coming back to you." 90
The Judge was able to get three votes in addition to his own
for a grant of certiorari. But the outcome was still in doubt. Justice
Jackson was ill and unable to take part in the case. Three other
Justices were determined to uphold the verdict. A four to four split
would affirm the death sentence. The Judge stayed home for several
days to prepare an opinion.
Meanwhile, I imagined that this would be a famous case, a
"case of first impression," the first case on mental coercion by the
use of psychiatry and hypnosis, a landmark. It would be noted in
every law review, included in every casebook, taught in every class
in both criminal and constitutional law, and in medical school as
well, cited in every future decision on interrogation ... but only if we
could get five votes, and that would require the vote of the Chief,
who up to that time had yet to vote in favor of a criminal defendant.
When the Judge showed us the draft opinion he had prepared,
my daydreams about a landmark case were suddenly dissolved. The
Leyra case would not be famous. It would never be taught in law
school or noted in the law reviews. The Judge had written the
simplest possible opinion. It was almost entirely factual. It appeared
to make no new law. Instead, the opinion made the case seem like
long established law. The Judge's special ideas about due process
were relegated to the inconspicuous last sentence of a footnote.91 For
those who might be interested, an appendix was included, running
twenty-two pages in U.S. Reports, containing excerpts from the tape
recording, without further comment. 92 The opinion itself took up
only five-and-one-half pages. Not a word in the opinion was the
least bit novel or controversial.
The Chief signed on! The Judge's strategy worked! He had
read the Chief's character perfectly. The Chief was not prepared to
' Id. at 560.
90 Id. at 571.
9
92

Id. at 558 n.3.

Id. at 562-84.
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make new law, but he would not tolerate the duplicity of a Dr.
Helfand. The Warren Court had begun.
On June 1, David and I went down to the courtroom. The
Chief presided over the usual admissions to the bar. Then he nodded
to Justice Black on his right. The Judge leaned forward. "I am
authorized to announce the Opinion and Judgment of the Court in
Camilio Leyra v. Wilfred Denno, Warden of Sing Sing prison, on writ
of certiorari to the Second Circuit of Appeals." Anyone who ever
heard Justice Black deliver an opinion from the Bench will never
forget the effect his soft but perfectly clear and distinct voice had on
the packed courtroom. It was still the custom to read opinions in full.
The Judge related the facts at length, while the legal conclusion was
condensed into a single sentence that made no mention of psychiatry:
"We hold that the use of confessions extracted in such a manner from
a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not consistent with due
process of law as required by our Constitution." 93 Finally, the Judge
read the judgment, overturning a death sentence and the holdings of
four courts below: "It was error for the court below to affirm the
District Court's denial of petitioner's application for habeas corpus.

Reversed."94
Two weeks before Leyra, Brown v. Board of Education had
been decided. David and I were in Court for the announcement, but
we had not worked on the case. After the dramatic events at the
Court that day, we returned to Alexandria and the Judge sat down
with us under the grape arbor for at least two hours. His first words
were, "Earl Warren has made his place in history." The Judge
apologized to David and me for the extraordinary secrecy with which
the case had been handled, but he also said that if there had been a
leak, we would have thanked him for keeping us uninformed. Now,
however, the Judge seemed eager to speak out. He had agreed to
make the opinion unanimous, but in fact he disagreed with the
enforcement part of the decision, under which implementation was
delayed for further arguments. The Judge said that the South would
resist no matter how cautiously the Court proceeded, so he would
have preferred to dispose of the cases like any other ordinary lawsuits
by ordering the plaintiffs to be admitted to the schools they applied to
9 Leyra, 347 U.S. at 561.
94 Id. at 562.
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"forthwith," with no further delay and no general hearing on the
broad issue of implementation. "I would have simply ordered them
in," he told us. But he had nothing but praise for the Chief s skill in
bringing the Court together. From the depths of the Rosenberg case,
the year had seen the Court rise to one of its greatest challenges.
In the early 1970s, after Justice Black had died, I was walking
near Huntington Park, at the top of Nob Hill in San Francisco, when I
came face to face with Chief Justice Warren, now retired. He said
that his doctor required him to circle the park ten times, and invited
me to join him. I repeated Justice Black's remark about the Chief s
place in history. He smiled with warm appreciation. "I'm off to Baja
tomorrow morning for some fishing," he said.
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POST-CLERKSHIP YEARS

Max Isenbergh, Elizabeth Black, Justice Black, CharlesReich
February27, 1966

After my clerkship was finished I remained in Washington,
D.C., for the next five years, working at the law firm of Arnold,
Fortas & Porter and living in an apartment house on Connecticut
Avenue. The firm was a small one near DuPont Circle, in a private
mansion formerly occupied by the late Justice Pierce Butler. The
three founding partners were all prominent ex-New Dealersinsiders. Justice Black remarried, his new wife Elizabeth was warm
and outgoing, and a huge bonus for me was the fact that the
wonderful evenings at South Lee Street continued.
I would be working at my desk in the mid-afternoon when the
phone would ring and the familiar voice of Justice Black would say,
"Charlie! Can you come out to dinner at six? Elizabeth has a steak
that looks perfect for three." Occasionally there would be another
guest, but most of these evenings were just the three of us. We never
talked Court business and we never mentioned current cases. And
sometimes a neighbor from across the street came over after dinner to
make a fourth for bridge.
In 1960, I joined the faculty at Yale Law School and moved
to New Haven. Only rarely did I travel to Washington, D.C. As a
professor, I wrote a number of law review articles. Justice Black
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read them, and I received comments in the mail, but we saw each
other only a few times a year, and this was a great loss for me. But
there were much greater losses to come.

CharlesReich and othersprotestingthe Vietnam War and
Dow Chemical Inc. in New Haven, Ct.
Originallypublished in the Yale Daily News on
December 13, 1967

A photograph in the Yale Daily News shows a group of
shivering protestors on a sidewalk in downtown New Haven on a
typical wet, cold, snowy winter day. I am bareheaded in the first row
of protestors, carrying a self painted sign reading "No More
Napalm." According to the caption, the protest was directed at the
presence of a Dow Chemical Co. recruiter on campus. This was
hardly the role I imagined for myself when I became a law professor.
But the discomfort I felt was overridden by the inhumanity of
dropping flaming chemicals from the air on human beings in
Vietnam-the newest escalation in the depravity of war. A law
professor does, after all, have a legitimate concern with what is being
done in the name of constitutional government.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court decided a case that also
involved a protest against the war in Vietnam. In December, 1965,
two high school students and one junior high school student in the
Des Moines public schools wore black armbands to school to
publicize their objections to the Vietnam War. 95 They were asked to

95 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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remove the armbands and were suspended when they refused. 96 The
case reached the Supreme Court and was decided in 1969. The
opinion of the Court, upholding the students' First Amendment right
to express their views by wearing the armbands, was written by
Justice Abe Fortas, my former employer. 97 It was a landmark
opinion on the subject that had always been of the highest importance
to Justice Black.
Instead, the Judge dissented. The tone of his dissent was
shocking. He said that "groups of students all over the land are
already running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and
smash-ins." 98 Justice Black's biographer, Roger K. Newman, reports
that the Judge told the other Justices in the conference that "[t]he
schools are in great trouble. Children need discipline-the country is
going to ruin because of it." 99 His published dissent in Tinker
denounces "a new revolutionary era of permissiveness." 00 And he
wrote to me that "I find it difficult to believe that students from the
kindergarten on through college have a constitutional right to use the
schools for advertising their political views."
In the 1960s, people who shared the same values and goals
for America began to find themselves divided and angry at each other
in ways that seemed inexplicable at the time, as if we were being
driven by forces that were not yet visible. For me, this process had
started earlier, when I published a law review article in 1964 that
proved to be far more controversial than I ever intended or imagined
and thus bore some resemblance to a "protest."lo' What did an
article called The New Propertyhave in common with picketing Dow
Chemical Co. or wearing a black armband to school? What did all of
them have in common with Justice Black denouncing the very free
speech he had championed for so long? It was not easy to see the
true picture at the time. And it was all acutely painful.
Today we can see that on one side of the dividing line was a
perception and fear of unchecked governmental power, and the
urgent need for those without power to express themselves. On the
other side were those who saw governmental power as necessary and
96

id

97 Id at 5 14.

Id at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 591 (Pantheon Books 1994).
" Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
10 The New Property, supra note 54.

9

9
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legitimate, and the protests as hysterical and dangerous. This dispute
might, of course, have been carried on calmly with mutual respect.
Instead, there was an intensity of feeling that swept people away. I
can only say that the Judge and I were evidently seized by opposite
sides of this society-wide impulse. I was out in the snow protesting
when I should have been doing the work of a legal scholar, and the
Court's greatest defender of free speech was upholding repression.
In 1967 President Johnson gave a reception at the White
House to honor Justice Black, and I did not attend because of my
opposition to the Vietnam War. In retrospect, this was a mistake.
Justice Black was hurt by my absence, and no one else was helped in
the slightest. I had met and listened to President Johnson at private
dinner parties on two previous occasions when he was still in the
Senate, and admired him greatly; as such, my objections had only to
do with Vietnam. My compass was swinging wildly.
In 1970 the Court decided a case in which I was deeply
interested, Goldberg v. Kelly.102 As it happened, one of Justice
Black's law clerks had been recommended by me and was a former
student: James Gustave Speth, now a distinguished figure in
environmental law. Many years later, Gus told me about the
arguments he had with Justice Black concerning Goldberg. At the
time, in 1970, I had a professional interest in the outcome of
Goldberg. The argument was one I had made six years earlier in The
New Property: welfare recipients should be accorded certain rightsrights based on the status of welfare benefits as "new property." 103
This status was required in an economy where government played an
ever increasing role in providing for needs such as education,
housing, and child health. 104 Otherwise, the "welfare state" would
lead to arbitrary and tyrannical power exercised as a means of control
over those in need.
Need must not be allowed to curtail liberty, I
argued.10 6
The Court upheld the rights of welfare recipients in Goldberg,
but Justice Black wrote a long and impassioned dissent, which did

102

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Id. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles A. Reich, IndividualRights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965); The New Property, supra note 54).
'0
See The New Property,supra note 54, at 737-38.
103

105
106

Id. at 787.

id.
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not make easy reading for me.107 Reflecting on the rise of the
welfare state, with all its attendant problems, he preferred to allow
Congress to write the rules, rather than have the courts make the rules
His trust in the fairness of
into constitutional mandates. 0 8
government was far greater than mine.
Roger Newman writes that as Justice Black aged, his
constitutional views became rigid and "almost calcified"-"Black's
Constitution had become all anchor and no sail." 0 9 It is possible that
this is true; it may have been old age or it may have been that in some
cases the protests had gone too far, and the protestors themselves
were the problem, rather than the conditions that gave rise to protest.
In the same year that Goldberg was decided, I published The
Greening ofAmerica. Justice Black read his copy carefully and filled
it with his usual comments and underlining. Meanwhile my
colleagues at Yale maintained a silence that, if it had been translated,
might have been expressed as "What's a law professor doing writing
a book like this?"
And this is how matters stood when the news of Justice
Black's death, on September 25, 1971, reached me in New Haven.
Together with Guido Calabresi I traveled to Washington for the
funeral at the National Cathedral. Guido and I had been friends since
his own clerkship days with Justice Black and thereafter as Guido
became a distinguished legal scholar, Dean of Yale Law School,
judge of the United States Court of Appeals, and a much-loved
mentor to many. For me, his presence at the service turned out to be
crucial. We sat together in a row of seats near the front reserved for
former law clerks.
The service was a formal one, with readings from sources
familiar to all of us in the Justice Black community. Then, as the
service almost ended, one of the former law clerks at the podium
began reading from the Judge's personal copy of The Greening of
America-not what I had written but critical comments that the Judge
had written in the margin and that I had never seen. I remember
sitting in the Cathedral feeling shocked and hurt. This seemed totally
out of place at a formal state funeral. It was personal and private,
something the Judge might have shown to me in his study with a
107

See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271-79 (Black, J., dissenting).

See id. at 275.
109 NEWMAN, supra note 99, at 594.
108
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smile. In the Cathedral, no other person had been singled out for
mention, and I felt attacked at a time and place when response was
impossible. Fortunately, Guido reached out, grabbed my hand and
held it. A hymn began. Guido and I stood and wept as the coffin
with its honor guard passed us on its way out of the Cathedral.

VIII.

JUSTICE BLACK'S VIEWS AND THE COURT TODAY

Today's Supreme Court may look the same as the Court in
the 1953 Term, but in fact it is a greatly changed institution. The
new Court accepts far fewer cases for review than the old Courtless than half as many, perhaps only one-third as many.o10 This is not
just a procedural change. It tilts the Constitution in the direction of
more unchallenged governmental and corporate power. Power grows
unless it is actively checked. Individual rights, in contrast, are lost
unless acted upon. The Supreme Court's passivity inevitably helps
power and reduces the enforcement of rights.
What is particularly strange about the present Court's
diminished caseload is the fact that the legal system over which the
Court presides has grown enormously in every possible way. There
are far more judges on the federal bench, many new areas of
constitutional controversy, such as the rights of public school
students or issues arising in the health care system, a vastly expanded
criminal justice system, and all of the nation's new activities around
the globe. How can there be fewer issues of importance, or fewer
injustices in need of remedy, than fifty years ago?
Justice Black was a strong advocate of taking more, not fewer
cases for review. When the Court denied review in what he
considered a deserving case, he often noted his dissent from this
denial. He believed that the Court had oversight responsibilities, that
it must seek out cases where justice demanded review. By his
standards, the Court today should be reviewing 400 cases per annum,
not a paltry seventy. After all, each Justice now has four brilliant law
clerks with time on their hands!
What is profoundly troubling is the cases we never hear
about-the cases denied review. What injustices, abuses of power
and unresolved conflicts never come to light because the Court
110See Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2007 Supreme Court Term, 25
TOURo L. REv. 541, 541-42 (2009).
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refuses to listen? The new Supreme Court appears far more aloof,
unreachable, unmoved.
Perhaps this remoteness is in part due to another significant
change in the Court since the 1953 Term: how new Justices are
chosen. The Court back then was comprised of three former United
States Senators (Justices Black, Burton, and Minton), several former
high administration officials (Justices Clark, Douglas, Jackson, and
Reed), and three former law professors (Justices Frankfurter,
Douglas, and Burton). Now the composition of the Court has shifted
almost exclusively to individuals who have already served on the
lower federal courts. This means the new appointees have a track
record. Their judicial views are known. They have been vetted, and
vetted again. A candidate with no known judicial views, such as
Hugo Black, would have little chance of being appointed today. The
Court has been "professionalized." Indeed, most of the members
seem to come from just a few Ivy League law schools. This has
made the Court a less democratic and less representative institution.
But it is not only the Justices who have been professionalized.
The Constitution itself has been professionalized, and that
development is a threat to the very nature of a democratic
constitution. When today's Justices appear on C-SPAN, they give
the impression that the Constitution is an obscure and esoteric
document that only an expert or scholar can understand. In contrast,
Justice Black insisted that the Constitution was written in plain words
that could be understood by ordinary people."'
The Court today is famous for its doctrinal disputes over how
to interpret the Constitution. Should the original intent of the
Framers be followed? Should the exact meaning of the text be
observed? Should the Court be "activist" or should it demonstrate
"judicial restraint"?
However, it is seldom made clear that all of this disputation
seems to apply only to the interpretation of individual rights and not
to the interpretation of the powers of the presidency and Congress.
When it comes to these powers, the present Court has not shown any
deference to the intent of the Framers. The national security state,
with its secrecy, its domestic surveillance, and its global reach,
cannot possibly be reconciled with the intent of the Framers. As is

11 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.

1, 13 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
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well known, they feared every form of unchecked power and
believed in strictly limited government.
The Court has upheld the national security state and many
other expansions of government power on the basis of "need": the
government must have the powers necessary for survival. 112 Justice
Black, however, took a decidedly more narrow view of government
powers. In the famous Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"'
Justice Black denied that the president had any power to take
possession of the steel industry without congressional authority. 114
He said that the president's powers were limited "in both good and
bad times," and that the Framers had chosen to limit all delegated
powers rather than trust to "need."115 In a memorable sentence
rejecting President Truman's national emergency claim Black wrote:
"It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of
power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice." 1 6
Justice Black's decision in the Youngstown case cost him the
friendship of President Truman, as he ruefully recalled to David and
me. The Blacks and the Trumans had been friendly since Senate
days and had much in common. But after the Youngstown decision,
Truman never again visited South Lee Street.117
Justice Black's voice was sorely needed when the Court
recently decided that corporations have the free speech rights of
individuals." 8 The constitutional status of corporations was an issue
of the greatest importance to him, and although we had no case on
this subject during our Term, David and I heard the Judge's views
frequently and fully.
In 1938, in a case involving the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Black dissented from the view that a corporation is included
within the constitutional meaning of "person."ll 9 He said then that
"the judicial inclusion of the word 'corporation' in the Fourteenth
See, e.g., Gitlow v. People, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
"' 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
112

114

Id. at 588-89.

"' Id. at 589.

id.
Two of President Truman's own appointees, Justices Clark and Burton, also voted to
overturn the seizure, and Truman reportedly made disparaging comments about both.
118 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 08-205, 2010 WL
183856, at *36 (U.S.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010).
119 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
116

117
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Amendment has had a revolutionary effect on our form of
government."l 20 No doubt he would have felt exactly the same about
extending the constitutional free speech rights of the individual to
corporations.
The debate since the recent decision was announced has
focused on the practical issue of corporate influence over elections
and the judicial issue of the Court's unseemly eagerness to overturn
established precedent. But Justice Black's concern went to a deeper
issue that today's commentators seem to have missed entirely. Can a
democracy admit to membership artificial "persons" who can be
replicated in unlimited numbers, are subject to control by others,
have no limits in lifespan or size, and are endowed with no morality,
no loyalty, no faith? Are corporations a legitimate part of "We the
People"?
In suggesting that corporations are merely an instrument
through which "the people" act, today's Court ignores what every
first year law student is taught-that corporations are a separate legal
entity with an existence of their own. Moreover, corporations often
engage in governmental functions, from operating prisons to waging
war. Corporations, unlike human beings, have no natural limits to
their power. Thus the recent Supreme Court decision does not only
raise the issue of money in politics, it raises the more profound issue
of entities as persons who are "of the people"-entities with
constitutional rights, interlopers to the human political community
that joined together to adopt the Constitution.
A constitution that grants sweeping powers both to
government and to corporations is an unbalanced constitutionunbalanced against the individual. The individual today has lost the
economic independence that was taken for granted by the Framers of
the Constitution, who could not foresee a time when employment
would become necessary for economic survival. There is a way to
restore that balance that is available within our present constitutional
framework. A future Supreme Court can recognize explicitly what is
now implicit-that individuals must be guaranteed access to the
means of economic survival. A "right to work" would be an
appropriate response to newly granted corporate rights.
In August 1953, when David Vann and I began work, we did

120

Id. at 89.
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not realize that the Court was about to embark upon a sustained
period of advances in individual rights, a pent-up agenda that would
occupy the entire period called "the Warren Court." Beginning with
Brown v. Board of Education what took place has been called a
"rights revolution."l21 I prefer to see it as a time of catching uprights catching up to a host of newly created powers.
Today's Court may well face a pent-up demand for economic
rights. If unemployment continues at a high rate, there will surely be
a presidential candidate astute enough to promise the appointment of
new Supreme Court Justices who will support a "right to work," as
Justice Douglas eloquently described it. And why not? That is the
way the interpretation of the Constitution has been changed many
times before.
Just as in 1953 there was a powerful demand for personal and
civil rights, so the need for economic survival serves as a basis for
individual economic protection. The need-based jurisprudence of
powers can be fully justified as applied to the position of the
individual as well.
Under the Due Process Clause no person shall be unlawfully
denied life, liberty or property. The legal challenge is to protect the
means of life, liberty and property. The Court has protected the
means to governmental survival. It will be under growing pressure to
protect the means to individual survival.
Justice Black relished the opportunity to re-think the meaning
of the Constitution by going back to the original sources and seeking
to be faithful to the kind of republic the Framers envisioned. Today's
judges, legal scholars, and law students can relish a similar creative
opportunity to protect individual independence and autonomy in an
age when the individual needs protection as never before.

121 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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